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A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S FIRST BITE AT 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPLE: THE 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EXCESSIVELY 
DEFERENTIAL CONCEPTION OF 
“ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS” IN 
CHILDERS v. FLOYD 
Abstract: On November 13, 2013, in Childers v. Floyd, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit found that Wyon Childers had failed to rebut the 
presumption that his Confrontation Clause claim was adjudicated on the merits. 
In this case, and a previous decision that led to it, the court conducted its habeas 
corpus review using a highly-deferential and vague conception of the threshold 
“adjudicated on the merits” inquiry. This Comment argues that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and other circuits should reexamine their standards for determining whether 
federal claims have been adjudicated on the merits by state courts in order to 
align themselves with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence and to provide a more 
accurate and just standard to the federal district courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), individuals seeking habeas corpus review in the federal court sys-
tem face a difficult challenge due to the highly-deferential standard applied to 
state court decisions.1 The state courts, however, are only entitled to this defer-
ence when they adjudicate a habeas petitioner’s federal claim on the merits.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (al-
lowing habeas review for claims that have been adjudicated on the merits only where there was an 
unreasonable interpretation of federal law or underlying facts at the state level); Childers v. Floyd 
(Childers IV), 642 F.3d 953, 987 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Wilson, J., concurring) (describing the 
standard under the AEDPA as involving “nearly insurmountable deference”), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 358 
(2013), opinion reinstated, 736 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2013); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal 
Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the 
AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 75, 76, 87 (2005) (arguing that the AEDPA created marked impediments to the ability 
of prisoners to obtain habeas review); Nathaniel Koslof, Comment, Insurmountable Hill: How Undue 
AEDPA Deference has Undermined the Atkins Ban on Executing the Intellectually Disabled, 54 B.C. 
L. REV. E. SUPP. 189, 189 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/15, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7V74-ZS3X (explaining that habeas review under the AEDPA is “severely circum-
scribed” and involves “stringent level of deference”). 
 2 See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091, 1097 (2013) (finding that the deferential AED-
PA standard does not apply when the state court does not consider the merits of a petitioner’s claim); 
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court has offered guidance on how to determine 
whether a state court adjudicated a federal claim on the merits, there is never-
theless a lack of uniformity amongst the circuit courts in regards to the proper 
standard and how to apply it.3 
Part I of this Comment provides a background of habeas corpus review 
under AEDPA, as well as a brief procedural and factual history of Childers v. 
Floyd.4 Part II then examines the inconsistent manner in which the circuit 
courts have interpreted and applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent when de-
termining whether a habeas petitioner’s federal claim has been adjudicated on 
the merits.5 Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit 
and other circuits should reexamine their standards for determining w a federal 
claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” in order to protect against a per se 
application of AEDPA deference.6 
I. HABEAS REVIEW UNDER AEDPA AND THE THRESHOLD  
“ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS” INQUIRY 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of habeas corpus review, as 
well as the implications of the AEDPA for individuals seeking habeas review.7 
Section B then examines the meaning and significance of the threshold “adju-
dicated on the merits” inquiry.8 Finally, Section C offers a summary of the fac-
tual and procedural details of the criminal case against Wyon Childers.9 
A. Habeas Corpus and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court shall consider an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus for an individual who is incarcerated pursuant to a 
judgment of a state court that is contrary to or in violation of the Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States.10 Habeas corpus review stands as a sig-
                                                                                                                           
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91, 99–100 (2011) (explaining that habeas review is “limited” 
when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court). 
 3 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1091; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; see also Childers v. Floyd (Chil-
ders V), 736 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam) (determining that claim was 
adjudicated on the merits by state court in the absence of some indication that the state court clearly 
overlooked it), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1558 (2014); Lint v. Prelesnik, 542 F. App’x 472, 477 (6th Cir. 
2013) (finding that the threshold inquiry requires scrutiny because there are multiple ways that a state 
court may fail to adjudicate a claim on the merits). 
 4 See infra notes 7–33 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 34–69 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 70–86 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 21–33 and accompanying text. 
 10 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012); Richter, 562 U.S. at 91(“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a 
safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.”). 
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nificant procedural safeguard aiming to provide relief to individuals who have 
exhausted all their available remedies at the state court level and who are in-
carcerated as a result of improper state court determinations of their rights.11 In 
1996, Congress passed the AEDPA with the goal of limiting overuse of habeas 
corpus and preventing delays in death penalty cases.12 
After the passage of the AEDPA in 1996, petitioners seeking habeas relief 
from a state court judgment are subject to a more deferential standard of re-
view.13 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, states that habeas 
corpus relief shall only be granted in two narrow situations: (1) when the deci-
sion of the state court was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established federal law,” or (2) when the decision of the state 
court was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”14 A crucial caveat to the 
AEDPA, however, is that the deferential approach to habeas review under 
§ 2254(d) only applies to federal claims that were in fact “adjudicated on the 
merits” by a state court.15 
B. The “Adjudicated on the Merits” Requirement 
The U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit have interpreted the meaning of the § 2254(d) “adjudicated on the mer-
its” requirement in a broad and permissive manner.16 In order to constitute an 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (stating that petitioners must exhaust 
state level remedies before seeking habeas review); Margery I. Miller, Note, A Different View of Ha-
beas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudicated on the Merits” Clause When Habeas Corpus Is Under-
stood as an Appellate Function of the Federal Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2593, 2594 (2004) (de-
scribing habeas corpus review as important recourse for state prisoners who have been wrongfully 
imprisoned). 
 12 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Entzeroth, supra note 
1, at 87 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-519, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 967 n.14; Miller, supra note 11, at 2595 
(explaining how the AEDPA increased the deference that federal courts give to state court decisions 
when reviewing habeas petitions). 
 14 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
 15 See id. § 2254(d); Miller, supra note 11, at 2612–13 (pointing out that AEDPA deference does 
not attach to state court decisions that were not adjudicated on the merits). Accordingly, federal courts 
conducting habeas review must determine whether or not the federal claim was adjudicated on the 
merits by the state court before applying the deferential AEDPA standard for habeas review provided 
by § 2254(d). See Miller, supra note 11, at 2611. 
 16 See Richter, 562 U.S. at 98–102 (stating that a federal claim can be presumed to have been 
adjudicated on the merits by a state court provided there are no indications or state law procedural 
principles suggesting otherwise); Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968 (defining an adjudication on the merits 
as any state court determination that does not rely exclusively on state law procedural principles); 
Wright v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
AEDPA was intended to allow great deference to state court decisions and that a federal claim will be 
considered to have been adjudicated on the merits provided that the state court’s determination was 
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adjudication on the merits, however, a state court’s decision must reach the 
substance of the habeas petitioner’s federal claim and cannot rely on procedur-
al grounds.17 
The determination as to whether a federal claim has or has not been adju-
dicated on the merits directly impacts what standard the federal court applies 
to review a petitioner’s habeas petition.18 Whereas claims that have been adju-
dicated on the merits are subject to AEDPA deference, petitioners who raise 
federal claims that have not been adjudicated on the merits are entitled to de 
novo review.19 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed federal courts 
to presume that a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, the 
Court has explicitly and repeatedly stated that this presumption is rebuttable.20 
C. Procedural and Factual Background of Childers v. Floyd 
Wyon Dale Childers, a former Escambia County Commissioner, was in-
dicted on June 17, 2002 in the Circuit Court for Escambia County, Florida for 
unlawful compensation and bribery.21 The State contended that Childers had 
                                                                                                                           
not based solely on state law procedural principles). Underlying this deference is a longstanding prin-
ciple that a state court must be given the chance to decide the merits of a claim before a petitioner can 
seek habeas relief. See Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 967 (citing Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009)). 
 17 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1100 (stating that an adjudication on the merits does not include 
state court determinations that rely solely on procedural grounds); Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 
1119, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 383 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004)) (ex-
plaining that a state court determination must consider the substance, and not just the procedural as-
pects, of an individual’s federal claim); Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968; BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCON-
VICTION REMEDIES, § 29:6 (2014) (commenting that a state court decision that does not address the 
substance of an individual’s federal claim does not satisfy the adjudication on the merits requirement). 
 18 See Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 967–68 (explaining that whether or not a claim is determined to 
have been adjudicated on the merits determines the level of deference that the federal court will apply 
to the state court decision); Meredith Regan, Comment, Lies, Damn Lies, and White Ink: The Conven-
ient Fiction of Adjudication on the Merits in Murdoch v. Castro, 52 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 135, 138 
(2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss6/12, archived at http://perma.cc/D45R-EY3L 
(highlighting that only claims that have been adjudicated on the merits are subject to AEDPA defer-
ence). 
 19 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cone, 556 U.S. at 472; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text 
(discussing the implications of the adjudicated on the merits inquiry on the level of deference that is 
applied under the AEDPA). A de novo hearing occurs when the reviewing court considers the matter 
anew, “giving no deference to a lower court’s findings.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 789 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 20 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1091, 1096–97; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; infra notes 40–43 
(discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to make the presumption that a claim has been 
adjudicated on the merits irrebuttable). 
 21 Childers v. Floyd (Childers III), 608 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 642 F.3d 
953 (11th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1452 (2013), opinion reinstated, 736 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 
2013). Childers was also indicted on one count of money laundering. See id. The indictments 
stemmed from actions committed by Childers, then an Escambia County Commissioner, surrounding 
the purchase of the Pensacola Soccer Complex by the Escambia County Board of County Commis-
sioners. Childers v. State (Childers I), 936 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc) (per 
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made a series of payments to Willie Junior, who also served as an Escambia 
County Commissioner at the time, in exchange for his vote to purchase a piece 
of property from Joe Elliot.22 Facing criminal charges of his own, Junior ac-
cepted a plea agreement where he agreed to testify against both Elliot and 
Childers.23 
In December 2002, Junior testified as a witness for the State in the trial of 
Elliot, where Elliot was acquitted.24 In the period between the Elliot acquittal 
and Childers’s trial, Junior altered his testimony to include further incriminat-
ing details about Childers’s actions and conduct.25 The State subsequently at-
tempted to revoke Junior’s plea agreement, but was precluded from doing so.26 
During Childers’s trial, defense counsel was not permitted to cross-examine 
Junior about the State’s attempted revocation of his plea agreement because the 
trial court determined that the evidence was irrelevant.27 Childers was convict-
ed in April 2003 of bribery and unlawful compensation.28 
In 2006, in Childers v. State (Childers I), Childers appealed his conviction 
to the Florida District Court of Appeal on the grounds that the trial court im-
properly prevented him from cross-examining Junior on the State’s attempt to 
revoke Junior’s plea agreement.29 Although the Florida District Court of Ap-
peal determined that the trial court had erred by finding the evidence irrele-
vant, it found that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice it created and therefore the convictions were upheld.30 
                                                                                                                           
curiam), rev’d sub nom. Childers v. Floyd, 608 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1452 
(2013), opinion reinstated, 736 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 22 Childers I, 936 So. 2d at 587. 
 23 Childers III, 608 F.3d at 780. 
 24 Childers I, 936 So. 2d at 588. 
 25 Id. at 588–89. 
 26 Id. at 589–90. 
 27 Id. at 590, 592. The evidence was found to be irrelevant by the trial court under section 90.401 
of the Florida Statutes. See id. Section 90.401 states that “[r]elevant evidence is evidence tending to 
prove or disprove a material fact.” FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (2014). Defense counsel was, however, able 
to cross-examine Junior extensively on his plea agreement and inconsistent statements. Childers I, 936 
So. 2d at 590–91. 
 28 Childers III, 608 F.3d at 787. 
 29 936 So. 2d at 587. Childers also based his appeal on the trial court’s refusal to allow question-
ing of Junior about the Elliot acquittal. Id. 
 30 Id. at 592–93, 596. The court considered the evidence under Section 90.403 of the Florida 
Statutes. Id. Section 90.403 states that “[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FLA. STAT. § 90.403. The Florida District Court of 
Appeal also affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude the acquittal in the criminal case against 
Elliot. Childers I, 936 So. 2d at 596. Childers subsequently sought certification of questions to the 
Florida Supreme Court, but his Motion for Certification was denied. Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 619, 
622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (denying Childers’s Motion for Certification due 
to lack of any substantial questions). 
2015] The Eleventh Circuit Examines the Conception of Adjudication on the Merits 169 
On December 14, 2006, Childers filed a petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus, arguing that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were vio-
lated when the trial court blocked cross-examination concerning the State’s 
attempt to revoke Junior’s plea bargain.31 The U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida denied Childers’ habeas petition.32 Childers ap-
pealed the denial of his habeas petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit.33 
II. DIVERGENT ANALYSES OF THE THRESHOLD “ADJUDICATED  
ON THE MERITS” INQUIRY 
In Childers IV and Childers V, as well as in several circuit court cases, the 
adjudicated on the merits requirement has emerged as a divisive issue that has 
resulted in several competing interpretations.34 Section A of this Part provides 
an overview of recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the “adjudicated 
on the merits” requirement.35 Section B and Section C of this Part examine the 
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the adjudication on the merits requirement 
in Childers IV and Childers V respectively.36 Section D of this Part then looks 
at the disparate treatment of the threshold inquiry amongst the U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals.37 
                                                                                                                           
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”); Childers v. Floyd (Childers II), No. 
3:07cv243/LAC/EMT, 2008 WL 2945555, at *1, 7 (N.D. Fla. July 24, 2008). Finding that Childers 
had been provided an adequate opportunity to confront Junior, United States Magistrate Judge Eliza-
beth M. Timothy recommended that the petition be denied. Childers II, 2008 WL 2945555, at *20–22. 
 32 Childers II, 2008 WL 2945555, at *1. Childers subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal and a 
Motion for Certificate of Appealability that were both denied by the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Florida. Id. 
 33 Childers III, 608 F.3d at 779–80; Childers II, 2008 WL 2945555, at *1, 7. Childers received a 
certificate of appealability from the district court on the sole issue of whether his Confrontation 
Clause rights were unconstitutionally limited by the state court. Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 965. The 
Eleventh Circuit held that Childers’s Confrontation Clause rights had been violated by the trial court 
and accordingly remanded the case to the U.S. District Court in order to grant Childers’s habeas peti-
tion. Childers III, 608 F.3d at 791–92, 794. 
 34 Compare Sadler v. Howes, 541 F. App’x 682, 689 (6th Cir. 2013) (reviewing a state court’s 
determination only to see if the lower court overlooked a claim due to “sheer inadvertence”), Childers 
v. Floyd (Childers V), 736 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam) (looking only at 
whether or not the state court completely overlooked a federal claim in order to determine whether or 
not the Richter presumption is rebutted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1558 (2014), and Childers v. Floyd 
(Childers IV), 642 F.3d 953, 987 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (analyzing a state court’s determination 
only to see if it relied exclusively on state law procedural grounds), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 358 (2013), 
opinion reinstated, 736 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2013), with Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 
(9th Cir. 2014) (considering multiple factors and the state court’s reasoning when determining wheth-
er or not a claim was adjudicated on the merits). 
 35 See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 44–61 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
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A. U.S. Supreme Court Guidance on the Threshold Inquiry 
In the years following the passage of AEDPA, a uniform interpretation 
and application of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “adjudicated on the merits” re-
quirement has eluded federal courts reviewing habeas petitions.38 In two im-
portant cases in 2011 and 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
order to attempt to elucidate the proper definition and scope of the threshold 
“adjudicated on the merits” inquiry.39 
In 2011, in Harrington v. Richter, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 
summary disposition by a state court that contains no opinion or citation to 
governing legal principles constitutes an adjudication on the merits of a peti-
tioner’s claim and is therefore subject to AEDPA deference.40 Despite the high 
degree of deference accorded to state court decisions under § 2254(d), the 
Court in Richter found that the presumption that a state court has adjudicated a 
petitioner’s claim on its merits can be rebutted.41 
In 2013, in Johnson v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the 
Richter presumption to situations where a state court addresses some, but not 
all, of a petitioner’s claims in a written opinion and rejects a petitioner’s feder-
al claim without explicitly considering it.42 Although it fortified an already ro-
bust presumption that a state court has adjudicated a federal claim on its mer-
its, the Court expressly declined to make the presumption irrebuttable.43 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Miller, supra note 11, at 2613–14 (pointing out that, as of 
2004, there was a split amongst the circuit courts as to how to apply the “adjudicated on the merits” 
requirement due to a lack of clarity from Congress); Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer to That 
Which Did Not Exist”: AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1451 
(2002) (arguing that, as of 2002, a question existed amongst the federal courts as to how to properly 
define and apply the “adjudicated on the merits” requirement). See generally John H. Blume, AEDPA: 
The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 273 (2002) (noting that, as of 2002, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had “said little about how § 2254(d) works beyond that it limits a federal court’s pow-
er to grant relief”). 
 39 See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091, 1094, 1096 (2013); Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86, 99–100 (2011). 
 40 562 U.S. at 99–100; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In other words, a presumption of AEDPA defer-
ence applies to state court decisions provided that the opinion does not contain any “indication or state 
law procedural bar to the contrary.” See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 
265 (1989)). Prior to Richter, the U.S. Supreme Court in Early v. Packer held that a state court’s fail-
ure to cite, or even be aware of, relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent in a written opinion did not 
preclude a finding that the state court’s decision was entitled to AEDPA deference. See Early v. Pack-
er, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 
 41 See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. In particular, the presumption may be overcome when a fed-
eral court has reason to believe that a state court’s decision was likely based on something other than 
an adjudication of the merits of the petitioner’s federal claim. See id. 
 42 See 133 S. Ct. at 1091, 1094, 1096. 
 43 See id. In describing when the “strong” Richter presumption can be rebutted, the Court dis-
cussed the possibility that a state court may fail to adjudicate a petitioner’s federal claim when it ap-
plies a state law standard that is less protective than the relevant federal law or constitutional standard. 
See id. at 1096. 
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B. The Broad Definition Established in Childers IV 
In 2011, shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in 
Richter, in Childers IV, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
sought to define the threshold inquiry of when a federal claim can be consid-
ered “adjudicated on its merits” by a state court.44 As part of its review of 
Childers’s habeas petition, the en banc majority defined adjudication on the 
merits in a broad and inclusive manner.45 The Eleventh Circuit held that all 
federal claims are to be considered adjudicated on the merits provided that the 
state court determination does not rely exclusively on a state law procedural 
bar.46 
The majority stated that its definition of “adjudicated on the merits” in 
Childers IV was essentially the same as the definition provided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Richter.47 When interpreting the protective language from 
Richter, the majority in Childers IV reasoned that “any indication or state law 
procedural principles to the contrary” referred only to instances where a state 
court had in fact relied exclusively on a state law procedural bar.48 Similarly, 
the majority found that the language in Richter allowing the presumption to be 
overcome if “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 
court’s decision is more likely” should be limited to instances where it appears 
that the state court relied exclusively on a state law procedural bar.49 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 957. 
 45 See id. at 968–69. In making this determination, the majority recognized that the term “adjudi-
cated on the merits” was already defined in a broad and highly-deferential manner by previous U.S. 
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases. See id. at 968; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100 (hold-
ing that summary dispositions by state courts are presumed, subject to rebuttal, to constitute an adju-
dication on the merits); Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that decisions, and not just opinions, may satisfy the requirement that a federal claim was 
adjudicated on its merits by a state court). 
 46 See Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968–69 & n.16 (citing Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d 778, 796 (11th 
Cir. 2010)). The majority’s definition also required that the federal claim presented by the petitioner 
be the same one that was considered by the state court. Id. at 968–69; see Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (2002). 
 47 See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968. In Richter, the Court stated that 
a federal claim may be presumed to have been adjudicated on the merits by the state court “in the 
absence of any indication or state law procedural principles to the contrary.” See 562 U.S. at 99–100. 
 48 See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968–69. This implicit reasoning is 
evinced by the fact that the majority concluded that its own definition of “adjudicated on the merits” 
was essentially the same as that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Richter, yet included no reference to 
any bases for finding that a state court failed to adjudicate a claim on the merits other than a clear 
application of a state procedural bar. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968–
69. 
 49 See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968 n.16. In incorporating this lan-
guage into its decision, the Court in Richter cited to a case involving a federal claim that was deter-
mined by a state court on the grounds of a state law procedural bar. See 562 U.S. at 99–100 (citing 
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). The majority in Childers IV concluded that the lan-
guage could not be divorced from the context of Ylst and therefore it was not applicable to cases that 
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Wilson sharply criticized the majority 
for needlessly reworking the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of “adjudicated 
on the merits.”50 He argued that the majority’s strictly procedural definition of 
the Richter presumption represented a substantial misunderstanding of the 
guidance provided by the Court.51 Judge Wilson also expressed concern that 
the majority’s minimization of the protective language from Richter would 
unfairly deny certain petitioners, such as Childers, the right to actually have 
their federal claims adjudicated on the merits by either a state or federal 
court.52 In lieu of the majority’s altered Richter presumption, the concurring 
opinion advocated for the court to retain the language in Richter that directs 
courts reviewing habeas petitions to give meaningful consideration to the 
threshold “adjudicated on the merits” inquiry.53 Following the decision in 
Childers IV, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case 
to the Eleventh Circuit in light of the decision in Williams.54 
C. The Limited Reevaluation of the Definition in Childers V 
In 2013, on remand, the Eleventh Circuit per curiam majority in Childers 
V reinstated its decision in Childers IV and held that Williams was not contrary 
to its earlier determination.55 The majority read Williams as impacting its pro-
                                                                                                                           
did not involve a state law procedural bar. See Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 968 n.16 (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. 
at 803). 
 50 See Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 981 (Wilson, J., concurring). According to Judge Wilson, a major 
consequence of the majority’s definition of the term “adjudicated on the merits” was that it would 
deleteriously and improperly diminish the ability of future habeas petitioners to rebut the Richter 
presumption. See id. at 987. In her dissent, Judge Barkett also argued that the majority improperly 
redefined the Richter presumption by interpreting “adjudicated on the merits” in a purely procedural 
manner. See id. at 990 n.2 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 51 See id. 981–82 (Wilson, J., concurring). Judge Wilson attributed the majority’s broad definition 
of “adjudicated on the merits” to its reliance on Early. See id. at 982–83 (citing Early, 537 U.S. at 7–
8). Judge Wilson noted, however, that the Court in Early never actually commented on a proper defi-
nition of the term “adjudicated on the merits” and therefore Early provided no support for the majori-
ty’s exclusively procedural interpretation of the Richter presumption. See id. at 983–85. 
 52 See id. at 981–982, 988. Specifically, Judge Wilson argued that the majority’s broad and pro-
cedurally-based definition of “adjudicated on the merits” would cause courts reviewing habeas peti-
tions to automatically equate the absence of a state procedural bar with an actual adjudication on the 
merits, even where a state court may have failed to consider a petitioner’s claim or evaluated the claim 
under a less protective, state law standard. See id. at 985. 
 53 See id. at 986–87. 
 54 See Childers v. Floyd, 133 S. Ct. 1452, 1452 (2013); supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text 
(explaining how the Court in Williams extended the Richter presumption to instances where a state 
court addresses some, but not all, of the petitioner’s claims). 
 55 See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1334–35 (citing Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1088). In Williams, the 
Court extended the Richter presumption to written state court opinions that do not expressly consider 
a habeas petitioner’s federal claim. See 133 S. Ct. at 1096. The Court stated that the Richter presump-
tion is rebuttable and petitioners’ claims should not be treated as per se adjudicated on the merits by 
the state court. See id. at 1096–97. 
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cedurally-oriented interpretation of “adjudicated on the merits” in Childers IV 
only in instances where there was clear evidence that the state court “inadvert-
ently overlooked” the federal claim presented by the habeas petitioner.56 In 
support of its finding that the state court did not overlook Childers’s claim, the 
majority determined that Confrontation Clause claim was subsumed and 
properly adjudicated under the state law analysis performed by the Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeal.57 As the state court did not inadvertently overlook Chil-
ders’s Confrontation Clause claim, the majority affirmed the previous denial of 
Childers’s habeas petition on the grounds that his claim had been adjudicated 
on the merits.58 
The dissenting opinion again argued that the Eleventh Circuit denied 
Childers’s federal claim without providing a primary adjudication of the claim 
on the merits.59 The dissent contended that the state law standard applied by 
the Florida District Court of Appeal was a less protective standard than the 
Confrontation Clause and, therefore, the state court’s decision could not be 
considered an actual adjudication on the merits pursuant to Williams.60 Addi-
tionally, the dissent advocated for an interpretation of Richter that recognizes 
both the substantive and procedural aspects that must be considered when 
evaluating whether a habeas petitioner has rebutted the Richter presumption.61 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1334–35. 
 57 Id. at 1335; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014) (“Relevant evidence is 
inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). As part of this de-
termination, the Childers V majority held that Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes provided Childers 
with the same degree of protection to confront witnesses testifying against him that he was entitled to 
receive under the Confrontation Clause. See 736 F.3d at 1334–35; note 26 and accompanying text. 
 58 See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1335. In support of this finding, the majority reasoned that the 
Florida District Court of Appeal’s explicit reference to and analysis of the Confrontation Clause in 
several concurring and dissenting opinions was clear evidence that the claim had not been overlooked 
by the state court. See id. at 1335 n.9. 
 59 See id. at 1335–36 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state court’s use of the less-
protective state law evidentiary standard did not constitute an adjudication on the merits of Childers’ 
confrontation clause claim); Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 988 (Wilson, J., concurring) (same). 
 60 See FLA. STAT. § 90.403; Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1097 (holding that the presumption that a state 
court has properly adjudicated a federal claim on the merits can be rebutted where the state law stand-
ard that is applied is less protective than the relevant federal standard); Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1335–
36 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Further, Judge Wilson pointed out that the majority failed to cite any au-
thority that supported the majority’s finding that the Confrontation Clause could be properly sub-
sumed by the Florida Rules of Evidence. See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1336. 
 61 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1336. Judge Wilson analyzed the issue as 
to whether Childers’s Confrontation Clause claim had been adjudicated on the merits using protective 
language from both Richter and Williams. See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1335–36 (citing Williams, 133 
S. Ct. at 1096; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100). Specifically, Judge Wilson argued that, because Florida 
Statutes Section 90.403 and the Confrontation Clause involve disparate procedural protections and 
standards of review, it was likely that the state court failed to adjudicate Childers’s federal claim on 
the merits due to its reliance on the less-protective state law standard. See id. at 1336. The majority’s 
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D. The Varying Conceptions of “Adjudicated on the Merits”  
Amongst the Circuits 
Even after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Richter and Williams, 
the threshold inquiry of whether a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s 
federal claim on the merits continues to represent a divisive issue both 
amongst and within the individual U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals.62 The con-
flict stems in large part from disparate interpretations of the language in Rich-
ter and Williams preserving a petitioner’s ability to rebut the presumption that 
a federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.63 
Recent case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is 
indicative of the tension and lack of clarity that exists regarding how to deter-
mine the threshold inquiry.64 In 2013, in Sadler v. Howes, the Sixth Circuit 
interpreted Williams narrowly and found that the petitioner failed to rebut the 
Richter presumption because the state court had not inadvertently ignored the 
petitioner’s federal claim.65 Conversely, in 2013, in Lint v. Prelesnik, the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that “sheer inadvertence” is only one situation that can lead to 
a finding that the Richter presumption was rebutted by a petitioner.66 
Furthermore, whereas the Eleventh Circuit adopted a very narrow inter-
pretation of Williams in Childers V, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has repeatedly focused on the protective language of Richter and Wil-
liams in addressing the threshold inquiry of whether a claim was adjudicated 
                                                                                                                           
opinion, on the other hand, only makes reference to Richter in so far as it is necessary to outline the 
procedural history of the case. See id. at 1332–33 (per curiam). 
 62 See Amado, 758 F.3d at 1131 (using a searching standard to determine whether an adjudication 
on the merits has occurred that includes the protective language from Richter); Childers V, 736 F.3d at 
1334–35 (considering only whether a petitioner’s claim was “inadvertently” overlooked by the state 
court); see also Sadler, 541 F. App’x at 689 (considering only whether a state court did not address a 
claim due to “sheer inadvertence”); Lint v. Prelesnik, 542 F. App’x 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2013) (deter-
mining that the “sheer inadvertence” of a state court is only one circumstance that could allow the 
Richter presumption to be rebutted). 
 63 Compare Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that a rebuttable 
presumption means that situations can arise where no state court record can establish an adequate 
basis for determining that a claim was adjudicated on the merits), with Sadler, 541 F. App’x at 689 
(interpreting the protective language of Richter and Williams as dicta and reviewing the state court’s 
decision only for sheer inadvertence), and Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1334–35 (reviewing the state 
court’s decision only for sheer inadvertence). 
 64 See Sadler, 541 F. App’x at 689; Lint, 542 F. App’x at 477. 
 65 See 541 F. App’x at 689; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Childers V, 736 F.3d 1331 (No. 
13-951) (arguing that the court in Sadler created a narrow definition of the adjudicated on the merits 
requirement through its selective and limited use of language from Williams). In reaching this deter-
mination, the majority found that the language in Williams stating that the Richter presumption was 
rebuttable in “unusual circumstances” was dicta. See Sadler, 541 F.App’x. at 689. 
 66 See 542 F. App’x at 477. The court in Lint interpreted the protective language from Richter and 
Williams as impacting its determination of the threshold inquiry. See id. (citing Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 
1096–97). 
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on the merits.67 In 2014, in Amado v. Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
incorporated the protective language from Richter and Williams into its stand-
ard for evaluating the threshold inquiry.68 Similarly, in 2013, in Ayala v. Wong, 
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, although Richter and Williams directed the 
courts to give deference to state court decisions, the Richter presumption is 
unquestionably rebuttable.69 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD CLARIFY ITS DEFINITION OF 
“ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS” IN ORDER TO GUARD AGAINST  
AN EFFECTIVELY IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
Although the Eleventh Circuit attempted to add clarity to the threshold 
inquiry in Childers IV, the combined impact of Childers IV and Childers V led 
to the creation of a rigid and seemingly impenetrable standard for determining 
whether a particular federal claim was “adjudicated on the merits.”70 Moving 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Amado, 758 F.3d at 1131; Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656, 665–66, 669 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013). In these cases, the Ninth Circuit has 
broadly interpreted Williams as affirming and extending the rebuttable Richter presumption, rather than 
as providing a definitive and exhaustive framework to evaluate the threshold inquiry. See Amado, 758 
F.3d at 1131; Ayala, 756 F.3d at 665–66, 669. 
 68 See 758 F.3d at 1131. In particular, the Ninth Circuit characterized the situations described in 
Williams where the Richter presumption has been rebutted as a non-inclusive list of examples, rather 
than a dispositive or exhaustive framework for addressing the threshold inquiry. See id. Further, the 
court interpreted Richter’s protective language to require courts reviewing federal habeas petitions to 
actually inquire as to whether there were, or could have been, arguments supporting a determination 
that a state court adjudicated a petitioner’s federal claim on the merits. See id. 
 69 See 756 F.3d at 665–66. The court found that the Richter presumption was rebutted because the 
state court likely applied a harmless error standard to adjudicate the petitioner’s federal claim. See id. 
at 665–67, 669. Alternatively, the court considered the possibility that the state court had overlooked 
the federal claim. See id. at 667–69. Although the federal claim was squarely before the state court, 
the Ninth Circuit nevertheless looked to the record and found that the state court had necessarily failed 
to adjudicate the claim on the merits. See id. at 669. 
 70 See Childers v. Floyd (Childers V), 736 F.3d 1331, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2013) (Martin, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1558 (2014); see also Childers v. Floyd (Childers IV), 642 F.3d 953, 
957 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit was “called on” to define 
the threshold inquiry), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 358 (2013), opinion reinstated, 736 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 
2013); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 16–18 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit creat-
ed an irrebuttable and “impossibly narrow” standard in its decision). In Childers IV, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit established a broad and procedurally-oriented approach to defining the threshold inquiry. See Chil-
ders V, 736 F.3d at 1337–38 (Martin, J., dissenting); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 
17–22; supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text. In reinstating its judgment from Childers IV, the 
court in Childers V interpreted Williams in a narrow manner, isolating the question as only whether a 
state court overlooked a claim due to “sheer inadvertence.” See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1334 (reconsid-
ering Childers’s claim only to examine whether “the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that 
[the] federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court” (quoting Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. 
Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013))); supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. Isolating this narrow language 
from Williams ignores the fact that Williams aimed to extend the presumption from Richter rather than to 
define an independent standard that applies to non-summary dispositions. See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 
1094; Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1335 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court in Williams ex-
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forward, the Eleventh Circuit and other circuits should seek to rework their 
definitions of the threshold inquiry to more closely adhere to the guidance of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, to guard against an irrebuttable presumption of defer-
ence, and to provide better guidance to the federal district courts.71 
One important reason for the Eleventh Circuit to redefine its conception 
of adjudication on the merits is to better align itself with the direction and 
guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme Court.72 As a result of the holdings of 
Childers IV and Childers V, the Eleventh Circuit has come dangerously close 
to creating an irrebuttable presumption that a habeas petitioner’s claim has 
been adjudicated on the merits.73 In Williams, however, the Court stated that, 
although robust, the Richter presumption is incontrovertibly rebuttable.74 Mov-
ing forward, the Eleventh Circuit should seek to reinterpret and reincorporate 
the protective language from Richter and Williams in order to establish uni-
formity with the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance on the threshold “adjudicated 
on the merits” inquiry.75 
Furthermore, given the burdensome standards that habeas petitioners face, 
the Eleventh Circuit should adopt a definition of the threshold inquiry that 
more genuinely reflects the directives of the U.S. Supreme Court in order to 
preserve and safeguard the vital procedural measure of habeas corpus relief 
itself.76 In theory, the threshold inquiry insists that one court—either state or 
                                                                                                                           
tended the protective language and presumption from Richter); see also Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656, 
667 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the presumption from Richter and Williams is one and the same). 
Further, by declining to readdress the substance of its earlier definition of the threshold inquiry, the Elev-
enth Circuit implicitly relied on and extended its conception of “adjudicated on the merits” provided in 
Childers IV. See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1338 (Martin, J., dissenting); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 65, at 17. 
 71 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99–100 (2011); infra 
notes 72–86 and accompanying text. 
 72 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. 
 73 See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1337–38 (Martin, J., dissenting); Childers IV 642 F.3d at 981–82 
(Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 74 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096. The narrow interpretation of this directive by the majority in 
Childers V provides almost no meaningful opportunity for a court reviewing a habeas petition to find 
that a state court did not adjudicate a federal claim on the merits. See 736 F.3d at 1334 (analyzing a 
state court decision as to whether or not the state court “inadvertently overlooked” the federal claim); 
id. at 1338–39 (Martin, J. dissenting) (expressing a belief that the majority ignored the guidance of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Williams by maintaining an irrebuttable presumption that a state court has 
adjudicated a federal claim on the merits); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 17 (arguing 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s rigid definition of the threshold inquiry contains an irrebuttable presump-
tion). The dissenting opinion goes as far as to argue that the standard developed in Childers V in fact 
created an irrebuttable presumption contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s instruction in Williams. See 
Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1338–39 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 75 See Williams, 133 S. Ct at 1096; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. 
 76 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; Richter, 562 U.S. at 91, 99–100; Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 988 
(Wilson, J., concurring) (“A right without a remedy for its transgression is no right at all . . . AEDPA 
was meant to preclude a criminal defendant’s second bite at the constitutional apple—not his first.”); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 26; Andrew L. Adler, The Non-Waivability of AEDPA 
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federal—actually adjudicate the underlying claim on the merits before a court 
reviewing a habeas petition can apply AEDPA deference.77 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s analysis in Childers IV and Childers V, however, jeopardizes this right of 
habeas petitioners by minimizing and reading away the protective language 
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court.78 
By more dutifully adhering to the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and reworking its conception of the threshold inquiry, the Eleventh Circuit will 
in turn be able to provide better guidance to the federal district courts.79 Cur-
rently, trends in the Florida federal district courts indicate the need for the 
Eleventh Circuit to provide a more clear and workable standard for resolving 
the threshold inquiry.80 Certain patterns in the Florida federal district courts 
                                                                                                                           
Deference’s Applicability, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767, 771–73 (2013) (pointing out the dramatic impact 
of AEDPA on habeas petitions and the markedly low success rates that habeas petitioners experience). 
In doing so, the court would provide a meaningful opportunity for lower courts to actually determine 
whether or not a petitioner’s claim was “adjudicated on the merits.” See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; 
Richter, 562 U.S. at 91, 99–100. 
 77 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009); Adler, supra note 76, 
at 772–73. 
 78 See Childers V, 736 F.3d at 1338–39 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority disre-
garded the directive of the Supreme Court in Williams by defining the Richter presumption in a way 
that makes it irrebuttable); Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 981–82 (Wilson, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
majority’s deviation from the guidance of the Supreme Court represents a failure to properly balance 
the deference that is owed to state courts with the need to ensure that “every habeas petitioner has an 
actual and meaningful opportunity to seek redress for constitutional violations”); supra note 70 and 
accompanying text (describing the rigid and seemingly irrebuttable standard established by the Elev-
enth Circuit). 
 79 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 26 (explaining how divergent interpreta-
tions of the threshold inquiry have led to disparate treatment of habeas petitioners and how clarifica-
tion of the proper definition of the threshold inquiry will help lower courts reviewing habeas petitions 
reach consistent and just results). 
 80 See, e.g., Coleman v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:11-cv-430-FtM-29CM, 2014 WL 
4373266, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2014) (providing a definition of adjudicated on the merits that does 
not acknowledge the Richter presumption is rebuttable); Ginlock v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 
5:11-cv-400-Oc-38PRL, 2014 WL 2805274, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2014) (stating that the pre-
sumption that a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits can only be rebutted when the court 
relied exclusively on state law procedural grounds); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 
26 (explaining that federal district courts are responsible for reviewing habeas corpus petitions and 
this function is impeded when the circuit courts do not provide the lower courts with a clear and 
workable standard for resolving the threshold inquiry). First, in a number of recent decisions, the Flori-
da federal district courts have ignored the Richter presumption and have instead relied on Ferguson v. 
Culliver, a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case from 2008, to establish that summary 
dispositions constitute adjudications on the merits. See Coleman, 2014 WL 4373266 at *1 (“A state 
court’s summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the 
merits which warrants deference.” (citing Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 
2008))); Nelson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:11-cv-327-Ftm-29CM, 2014 WL 4101638, *3 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014) (same); Barnes v. Sec’y, DOC, No. 2:11-cv-362-FtM-29CM, 2014 WL 
4092460, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2014) (same). Despite being decided after Richter and Williams, these 
federal district court cases make no reference to the rebuttable nature of the “adjudicated on the merits” 
presumption, a principle that the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in Richter and Williams. 
See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; Coleman, 2014 WL 4373266 at *1; 
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indicate that confusion over the proper definition and application of the thresh-
old inquiry is not limited to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals.81 Florida fed-
eral district courts rely on Eleventh Circuit precedent in handling habeas peti-
tions and, therefore, Eleventh Circuit habeas petitioners would benefit greatly 
from the development of a standard that further incorporates the protective 
language of Richter and Williams.82 
In subsequent cases, the Eleventh Circuit, and other circuits with similarly 
stringent understandings of the threshold adjudicated on the merits inquiry, 
should adopt the interpretation of the “adjudicated on the merits” standard pro-
vided by the Ninth Circuit.83 Such an interpretation gives meaningful consider-
ation to the protective language in Richter and Williams and helps to guard 
against the creation or implementation of an irrebuttable standard in subse-
quent cases.84 Further, closer adherence to the U.S. Supreme Court’s directive 
in Richter and Williams that the Richter presumption is rebuttable will help 
promote uniformity between the courts and greater predictability of results for 
habeas petitioners.85 Although it may be a more ambiguous standard than the 
rigid interpretations from Childers IV and Childers V, preference must be giv-
                                                                                                                           
Nelson, 2014 WL 4101638, at *3. Also, even after the decisions of Williams and Childers V, some fed-
eral district court decisions have continued to cite Childers IV for the proposition that a federal claim 
should be considered adjudicated on the merits absent a state law procedural bar to the contrary. See 
Ginlock, 2014 WL 2805274, at *1 (“[U]nless the state court clearly states that its decision was based 
solely on a state procedural rule [the court] will presume that the state court has rendered an adjudica-
tion on the merits when the petitioner’s claim ‘is the same claim rejected’ by the court.” (quoting 
Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 969)); Roberts v. Florida, No. 2:11-cv-364-FtM-38DNF, 2014 WL 2600089, 
at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (same); Hutchins v. Sec’y, DOC, No. 2:11-cv-210-FtM-38DNF, 2014 
WL 2212082, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 28, 2014) (same); Love v. Sec’y, DOC, No. 2:11-cv-546-FtM-
29CM, 2014 WL 2155240, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2014); Burrow v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 
2:11-cv-60-FtM-29UAM, 2014 WL 1092452, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2014) (same). 
 81 See Coleman, 2014 WL 4373266, at *1; Ginlock, 2014 WL 2805274, at *1; supra notes 79–80 
and accompanying text. 
 82 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State 
Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 245 (2006) (pointing out that federal district courts look 
to the U.S. Supreme Court and then to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the circuit where the district 
court is located in order to obtain legal guidance and precedent). 
 83 See Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing and incorporating 
the rebuttable nature of the Richter presumption into the court’s analysis of the threshold inquiry); 
Ayala, 756 F.3d 665–667, 669 (explaining that the Richter presumption can be rebutted for numerous 
reasons and therefore state court decisions should be scrutinized to determine if there was in fact an 
adjudication on the merits). 
 84 See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100; Amado, 758 F.3d at 1131; Ayala, 
756 F.3d at 665–67, 669; Childers IV, 642 F.3d at 987–88 (Wilson, J., dissenting); see also Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 21–22 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of the 
threshold inquiry completely ignores the Supreme Court’s directive in Richter and Williams to not 
create an irrebuttable presumption in favor of finding that a state court has adjudicated a claim on the 
merits). 
 85 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 26. 
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en to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis to preserve a shred of the integrity and mean-
ing of the threshold “adjudicated on the merits” inquiry in future cases.86 
CONCLUSION 
In Childers IV and Childers V, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit’s attempt to clarify the threshold inquiry had the ironic effect of further 
exacerbating the circuit split regarding the proper interpretation and applica-
tion of the “adjudicated on the merits” requirement. In a subsequent decision, 
the Eleventh Circuit should reexamine Richter and Williams in an effort to bet-
ter balance the deference owed to state courts with the right of habeas petition-
ers to have one court actually consider their federal claim on the merits. This 
approach should be followed by other circuits who have adopted similarly nar-
row and inattentive interpretations of the threshold inquiry. A definition of the 
threshold inquiry that aims to substantively analyze whether or not a habeas 
petitioner has had their claim adjudicated on the merits will help protect 
against the creation of an irrebuttable presumption and per se AEDPA defer-
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 86 See Amado, 758 F.3d at 1131; Ayala, 756 F.3d at 665–67, 669; Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 
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